Aphantasia

Aphantasia¹⁾²⁾ framed as a cognitive deficit is a neurological condition characterised by an individual's inability to visualise images in their mind. People with aphantasia do not experience visual imagery, and their “mind's eye” is effectively blind. This condition can impact the ability to recall visual memories, imagine future scenarios, or even engage in visual creativity, such as drawing from imagination. The term “aphantasia” was first coined in a study led by cognitive neurologist Adam Zeman in 2015.

Apart from this framing it is e.g. possible that a weak or absent ability to have imagined visual sensations is balanced by a heightened resistance to intrusive thoughts ³⁾ . There is considerable variation in people's ability to experience imagined visualizations, ranging from a lifelong inability (Congenital Aphantasia) to those who report imagined experiences as vivid as actual perception (Hyperphantasia).

The diagnosis of aphantasia has sparked considerable debate within the scientific and medical communities. While some researchers argue that aphantasia is a genuine neurological condition, others question its validity, proposing that it may be more of a subjective experience or an extreme end of a spectrum of visual imagery abilities.

The most current state of neurological insight is that People with aphantasia still have a blueprint for mental imagery, even if they can’t consciously ‘see’ it. “People with aphantasia actually do seem to have images of a sort, they remain too weak or distorted to become conscious or be measured by our standard measurement techniques” (Lilly Matson, January 2025)(Chang, Shuai et al., January 2025)

Aphantasia is defined as a condition where an individual has a reduced or absent ability to generate voluntary visual imagery. In affected individuals, the process of visualisation—mentally picturing objects, scenes, or people—is significantly impaired or entirely lacking. This phenomenon can be measured through self-reports, psychometric tests, or neuroimaging techniques. Aphantasia can vary in manifestation, from the complete absence of mental imagery to a partial or inconsistent ability to form visual images.

The terms “aphantasia ⁴⁾⁵⁾” and “hyperphantasia ⁶⁾” describe the absence and abundance of visual imagery. At their far ends, these conditions affect about 1% for aphantasia and 3% for hyperphantasia, often displaying familial inheritance. These variations in conscious experience manifest across various contexts and likely encompass subcategories awaiting detailed definitions.

While individuals with extreme imagery often experience effects on other forms of imagery like dreams and spatial visualization, aphantasia typically leaves autobiographical memory and facial recognition intact, albeit diminished. Aphantasia may have links with autism but could potentially confer protection against certain mental health conditions. Recent research has primarily focused on aphantasia, shedding light on its position along the vividness spectrum (Adam Zeman, March 27, 2024).

Aphantasia and hyperphantasia can be seen as facets of neurodiversity — natural variations in cognitive, personality, and behavioural traits. A recent study concluded that aphantasia does not significantly disrupt daily activities or mental well-being enough to warrant classification as a mental disorder (Merlin Monzel, Annabel Vetterlein, Martin Reuter, 04 December 2022). Both conditions likely offer their own set of advantages and disadvantages. They are part of a group of comparable differences in experience and behaviour, alongside congenital synesthesia ⁷⁾ and prosopagnosia ⁸⁾, which are often not noticed.

Scientific research focuses on the relationships between imagery, perception, memory, neurodevelopment, and mental well-being.

Two significant conclusions have emerged from the scientific study of aphantasia.

• Firstly, conscious sensory imagery is not a prerequisite for human cognition, challenging Aristotle's notion that “the soul never thinks without a phantasma.”
• Secondly, creative accomplishments among individuals with aphantasia suggest that sensory imagery is not indispensable for creative imagination, underscoring the ability to represent, reshape, and conceive ideas even in its absence.

The marked differences in subjective experience caused by imagery extremes can be expected to have major behavioural effects, e.g. Aphantasia is over-represented among people working in mathematical, computational, and scientific roles, whereas people with hyperphantasia are more likely to work in traditionally 'creative' industries and around 40% of people with aphantasia describe difficulty with face recognition, twice as much as normal (Adam Zeman, September 2020, Pages 426-440).

For a more in-depth explanation and reference, please refer to the cited Publication (Adam Zeman, March 27, 2024)

The diagnosis of aphantasia has sparked considerable debate within the scientific and medical communities. While some researchers argue that aphantasia is a genuine neurological condition, others question its validity, proposing that it may be more of a subjective experience or an extreme end of a spectrum of visual imagery abilities.

The most current state of neurological insight is that People with aphantasia still have a blueprint for mental imagery, even if they can’t consciously ‘see’ it. “People with aphantasia actually do seem to have images of a sort, they remain too weak or distorted to become conscious or be measured by our standard measurement techniques” (Lilly Matson, January 2025)(Chang, Shuai et al., January 2025)

Our results show that when someone with aphantasia tries to imagine, their brains still seem to create a representation in the early visual cortex. It’s like their brain is doing the math but skipping the final step of showing the result on a screen. Prof. Joel Pearson.</blockquote> Research exploring this phenomenon investigates how differences in visualization abilities affect involuntary imagery and its neural underpinnings. For example, participants were asked either to visualize or to suppress visualization of specific scenarios, like a pink elephant, while their brain activity was monitored using electroencephalography (EEG). The vividness of individuals’ voluntary visualizations correlated with their likelihood of experiencing involuntary imagery, influenced by neural mechanisms tied to disinhibition, working memory, and feedback processing. These findings reveal that the strength of involuntary visual experiences often scales with the intensity of one’s capacity for voluntary visualization, shedding light on the broader implications of aphantasia and its neurological basis. (Derek H. Arnold, et al., Volume 183, February 2025, Pages 53-65) ==== Controversy 1: Subjective Experience vs. Neurological Condition ==== One central point of contention is whether aphantasia should be classified as a neurological condition or simply a variation in cognitive experience. Critics argue that the lack of mental imagery could be more accurately described as a subjective experience rather than a diagnosable condition. These skeptics point out that the methods used to diagnose aphantasia, such as self-reported questionnaires and introspective accounts, are inherently subjective and difficult to verify scientifically. Proponents, however, argue that neuroimaging studies have shown differences in brain activity between individuals with and without aphantasia, suggesting a neurological basis for the condition. These studies indicate that individuals with aphantasia exhibit reduced activity in brain regions associated with visual imagery, such as the posterior parietal cortex and the frontal eye fields. ==== Controversy 2: Continuum of Imagery Ability ==== Another controversy revolves around aphantasia existing on a continuum of imagery abilities. Some researchers propose that aphantasia is simply the lower end of a spectrum where people vary widely in their capacity to generate mental images. They argue that it is difficult to draw a clear line between individuals with “normal” visual imagery and those with aphantasia and that labelling it as a distinct condition may be misleading. Conversely, others advocate that some individuals' complete or near-complete absence of visual imagery is distinct enough to warrant recognition as a separate condition. These advocates suggest that the stark contrast between people who experience rich visual imagery and those who experience none at all indicates that aphantasia should be regarded as a legitimate and specific cognitive phenomenon. ==== Is Aphantasia a Real Condition? ==== Whether aphantasia is a “real” condition is complex and remains unresolved. Critics argue that the reliance on subjective reporting and the lack of clear diagnostic criteria make it difficult to establish aphantasia as a legitimate condition conclusively. Additionally, they suggest that more research is needed to understand the underlying mechanisms and develop objective diagnostic tools. On the other hand, advocates for recognising aphantasia as a real condition highlight the growing body of research demonstrating consistent differences in brain function and cognitive processing between individuals with and without aphantasia. They also emphasise the importance of acknowledging aphantasia's impact on individuals' lives, particularly in areas such as memory, creativity, and emotional processing. ^ Issue ^ Position ^ Reference ^ | Subjectivity in Diagnosis | Critics argue that the diagnosis relies too heavily on subjective self-reporting. | Pearson, J. (2019). The human imagination: the cognitive neuroscience of visual mental imagery. *Nature Reviews Neuroscience*, 20(10), 624-634. doi:10.1038/s41583-019-0202-9 | | Continuum of Imagery Ability | Some researchers see aphantasia as part of a spectrum rather than a distinct condition. | Zeman, A., et al. (2020). Phantasia – The psychological significance of lifelong visual imagery vividness extremes. *Cortex*, 133, 394-406. doi:10.1016/j.cortex.2020.09.014 | | Existence as a Real Condition | Proponents argue that neuroimaging and consistent cognitive differences support the existence of aphantasia as a real condition. | Zeman, A., Dewar, M., & Della Sala, S. (2015). Lives without imagery – Congenital aphantasia. *Cortex*, 73, 378-380. doi:10.1016/j.cortex.2015.05.019 | =====IEMT and Aphantasia===== In a short survey with practitioners ⁹⁾ the experiences with aphantasia differ. <blockquote> Personal view: I've met quite a few “aphantasics” recently. Most were walking excuse machines; this is just another pseudo-diagnosis they can add to their repertoire. I'm not denying that people's ability to visualise is on a spectrum. Some will meet the clinical criteria, but none I've met have any of them. For them, it's just the latest bandwagon to jump on. If a client contacts me and tells me they are aphantasic, I will most likely decline their appointment request. Andrew T. Austin </blockquote> <blockquote> I have had some people say they couldn’t visualise, but after the work, they started to “see” /describe aspects of the memory. This was after the emotional loading was reduced. Lori Heinzman Donnelly </blockquote> <blockquote> Don't ask them to visualize. Just let them talk about the memory or the thought. “Just concentrate on that thought/memory…” I have family members who can't visualize. They access memories in their own way. Mavis Kerrigan </blockquote> Regarding that sensory imagery is not indispensable for creative imagination, underscoring the ability to represent, reshape, and conceive ideas even in its absence, it seems that for IEMT the takeaway points at the moment are: * Visualizing is not a prerequisite for doing IEMT. * Use the frame “memory” or “ “thought” instead of “visualize”. * Dependence on the emotional content - K Pattern / reevaluate. * It can be a pointer to a detrimental mindset of the client to this kind of intervention